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NOTES 
Does a Copyright Coowner's Duty To Account Arise 
Under Federal Law? 
Craig Y. Allison 
A difficult question arises when a copyright coowner exploits a 
copyright without the consent of the other owners. The other owners 
cannot sue him for copyright infringement, the only cause of action 
explicitly created by the Copyright Act of 1976, because an owner can-
not infringe on his own work. 1 For decades, however, the courts have 
provided a remedy by imposing a duty on the coowner to account to 
the other owners for the profits reaped from copyright.2 Although 
both state and federal courts have imposed this duty to account, the 
question remains whether it derives from state or federal law. 
Joint ownership cases may be divided into two categories. In joint 
authorship cases, the dispute concerns whether the plaintiff contrib-
uted sufficiently to a work to be considered a coauthor. In contract 
cases, the plaintiff claims ownership by virtue of an assignment from 
the original author. The answer to the question whether the duty to 
account arises from state or federal law may differ depending on how a 
dispute is categorized because state and federal interests differ in these 
two classes of cases. 
A clear answer to this question is necessary for several reasons. 
Plaintiffs need to be certain which forum bas jurisdiction over their 
claim. Because federal courts have exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
copyright law, 3 plaintiffs who bring suit in the wrong forum will have 
their complaints dismissed, causing additional expense and delay. 
Furthermore, claims of joint authorship are likely to arise with in-
creasing frequency because recent interpretation of the work-for-hire 
doctrine restricts copyright protection for employers.4 Thus, copy-
right plaintiffs are now likely to bring joint ownership claims with suf-
ficient frequency to require resolution of the jurisdictional question. 
This Note discusses both the source of the accounting rule and the 
1. See 17 u.s.c. § 501-10 (1988) (chapter on remedies); 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW 
OF COPYRIGHT§ 4.03(B][4] (1991); 1 MELVIN D. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
CoPYRIGHT § 6.10, at 6-26 (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER]. 
2. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.12[A]. 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (the federal copyright jurisdiction statute). 
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire); Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748-50 (1989) (judicial construction of the § 101 defini-
tion); infra notes 22-52 and accompanying text. 
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proper forum for applying the rule. Part I provides a general history 
of joint ownership and the duty to account and suggests that the 
number of litigants presenting joint ownership claims will probably 
increase. Part II discusses joint ownership case law chronologically. 
This Part shows that the case law is consistent with the view that the 
duty to account was a creation of the federal courts. Part III argues 
that the accounting rule is federal common law and that federal juris-
diction necessarily follows for all copyright accounting cases. But 
even if the courts hold that the duty to account is state law, this Part 
argues that jurisdiction does not always lie in the state courts. Federal 
courts should exercise jurisdiction over actions in which the plaintiff 
pleads copyright ownership by virtue of joint authorship. 
I. HISTORY OF THE JOINT OWNERSHIP CONTROVERSY 
This Part examines the history of joint copyright ownership. Sec-
tion I.A discusses the evolution of joint copyright ownership, which 
culminated with the recognition of the duty to account. Section I.B 
describes how the Copyright Act of 1976 and later judicial interpreta-
tions of that Act have combined to increase the likelihood of joint 
ownership disputes. With greater numbers of disputes, the courts will 
need to resolve the jurisdictional questions over the duty to account. 
A. Historical Background of Joint Ownership and the Duty To 
Account 
The controversy over the source of the duty to account can best be 
understood by looking at the historical development of the law of joint 
ownership. Until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,5 the 
courts created and developed the law of joint ownership. 6 In many 
respects, the joint ownership provisions in the 1976 Act merely codify 
this judge-made law.7 Thus, uncertainty in the present federal statute 
arises directly from uncertainty in the previous case law. This section 
discusses the development of the joint ownership case law. 
The courts had at least three choices from which to fashion the 
rules governing copyright coowners. The simplest is to allow each 
coowner to exploit the work freely with no duty to account. This was 
the earliest rule, set forth in Carter v. Bailey, 8 which held that an 
owner could reproduce and sell a jointly authored book without the 
consent of the other owner and without accounting for the profits. 
5. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-810 (1988). 
6. For example, joint work is undefined in the Copyright Act of 1909, the predecessor of the 
1976 Act. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; 1 ABRAMS, supra note l, § 4.03[A][2]. 
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 104 (1975); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
8. 64 Me. 458, 463-64 (1874). 
2000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1998 
This rule, which was consonant with the patent laws,9 may have led to 
wider publication of already-existing works, because one owner was 
not able to veto another owner's exploitation of a work.10 Later courts 
rejected the Carter rule, however, on the ground that exploitation by 
one owner may effectively destroy the residual value of the copyright 
to the other owners. 11 Commentators also pointed out that the rule 
may lead to a race between joint owners to exploit a work and thus a 
waste of the value of the copyright.12 
A second rule, the English rule, provides that no coowner may 
exploit his interest in a copyright without the consent of all coown-
ers.13 This rule thwarts the owners' race to exploit by preventing such 
exploitation until all owners agree to an equitable distribution of the 
profits. But the English rule may impede publication of a joint work 
because a would-be copyright licensee may be unable to obtain the 
consent of all coowners. I4 
American courts have rejected the Carter rule and have universally 
settled on a third position: A coowner may exploit a joint work with-
out the other owners' consent but must account to the other owners 
for all resulting profits. Is Like the English rule, the accounting rule 
prevents any owner from depleting the value of the copyright at the 
expense of the other owners. It also deters a destructive race among 
owners to exploit the copyright.16 By allowing independent exploita-
tion by each owner, the accounting rule impedes publication less than 
the English rule. Furthermore, the accounting rule avoids the unfair-
ness that sometimes results under the Carter rule. An unsophisticated 
coauthor who made no contractual provision for sharing the profits 
would be able to recover under the accounting rule, but not under 
Carter v. Bailey. Such considerations of fairness have caused some 
courts to justify the duty to account on the ground of a constructive 
9. Joint owners of a patent have no duty to account to one another. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1988). 
10. Note, Accountability Among Co-Owners of Statutory Copyright, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1550, 
1556 (1959). This rule would provide no incentive to the creation of new joint works, however, 
and might even discourage their creation, since each author might expect to lose income from the 
independent exploitation of other authors. 
11. See Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Miller Music, 74 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947). 
12. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.12[A], at 6-28. Waste may occur when two coowners com-
pete to sell rights in a work to the same licensor, who may play one owner against the other to 
purchase the rights at well below market value. The court implied that this happened in Jerry 
Vogel Music Co., 74 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28. 
13. See Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (1879); Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 
[1916] 2 K.B. 325; Note, supra note 10, at 1558. 
14. See Note, supra note 10, at 1558. 
15. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry 
Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modified, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (12th Street 
Rag); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (My 
Melancholy Baby); 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.12[A]. 
16. See Note, supra note 10, at 1559. 
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trust between joint copyright owners.17 
The Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated the accounting rule with-
out modification.18 The Act itself only briefly addresses the issue. The 
1976 Act defines joint work as "a work prepared by two or more au-
thors with the intention that their contributions be merged into insepa-
rable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."19 The Act's only 
explicit mention of coownership provides that such joint authors are 
"coowners of copyright in the work."20 The Committee Reports ex-
plain the brevity of these provisions as follows: 
There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the 
rights and duties of coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is 
left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a 
copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each 
coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, 
subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.21 
Thus, the present state of the accounting rule under the 1976 Act is 
found in the case law that fashioned the rule. 
B. Increasing Importance of Joint Ownership and the Duty To 
Account 
Although the duty to account changed little with the enactment of 
the Copyright Act of 1976, the 1976 Act substantially changed previ-
ous doctrine on work for hire. 22 This section explores how receµt 
Supreme Court interpretation23 of the work-for-hire provisions of the 
1976 Act may increase the number of litigants claiming joint owner-
ship of copyright. Such an increase demands that the courts resolve 
the jurisdictional issue concerning the duty to account. 
Exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal copyright issues makes a 
clear choice of forum especially important in copyright accounting 
cases. State courts normally have concurrent jurisdiction over federal 
questions.24 Exclusive federal jurisdiction,25 however, means that a 
state court must dismiss the complaint of a plaintiff who erroneously 
brings a copyright action in state court. On the other hand, courts 
17. See e.g., Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1915); 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, 
§ 6.12[A], at 6-27. 
18. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 104 (1975). 
19. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988). 
20. 17 U.S.C. § 20l(a) (1988). 
21. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 104 (1975). 
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire). 
23. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
24. Grubb v. Public Utils. Commn., 281 U.S. 470, 476 (1930); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(1988) (defining federal question jurisdiction). 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) ("Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the 
states in ... copyright cases."). 
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have traditionally considered many of the disputes over transfer of 
copyright ownership to be state contract questions.26 The federal 
courts have jurisdiction only over contract disputes that satisfy the 
requirements of diversity or supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss 
claims if incorrectly brought in federal court.27 The plaintiff must 
therefore make the correct choice of forum or suffer dismissal. 28 This 
problem of battling exclusivities occurs only in the few areas of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction,29 and it can cause substantial hardship if, as 
in the case of joint ownership and the duty to account, the proper 
forum is unclear. 
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, copyright initially vested in the 
employer in the case of a work made for hire. 30 The 1909 Act left to 
the courts the task of defining the terms employer and works made for 
hire. 31 Courts eventually concluded that a work was made for hire 
when the employer had the right to control or supervise the creation of 
the work;32 the employer did not have to participate in or have actual 
control over its creation.33 This "right to control" standard presumed 
that a person who hired either an independent contractor or a tradi-
tional employee to produce a work was the statutory author and thus 
the copyright owner. 34 
The Copyright Act of 1976 and its interpretation in Community 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 35 radically curtailed the work-for-
hire doctrine. The 1976 Act limits works made for hire to two types: 
first, works prepared by employees, and second, certain categories of 
works prepared by independent contractors. 36 A work created by an 
independent contractor qualifies as a work made for hire only if it falls 
under one of nine categories enumerated in the definition, and only if 
the parties expressly agree in writing to consider it a work made for 
26. See 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS· 
DICTION AND RELATED MATI'ERS § 3582, at 310-13 (2d ed. 1984). 
27. See id. at 313. 
28. See, e.g., Maxey v. R.L. Bryan Co., 368 S.E.2d 466 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff's 
breach of contract suit over a copyright was dismissed when the state court held that construe· 
tion of the copyright statute was required). 
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988) (federal crimes); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (bankruptcy); 
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (patent and copyright cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988) (actions against 
consuls and vice consuls). 
30. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, sec. 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88. 
31. Matthew R. Harris, Note, Copyright, Computer Software, and Work Made for Hire, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 661, 670 (1990). 
32. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03(B][l][a]; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 
F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1941). 
33. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03(B][l][a]. 
34. See Harris, supra note 31, at 671-73. 
35. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire). 
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hire.37 This provision changes previous law considerably, giving the 
independent contractor, rather than the hiring party, the initial copy-
right in a work unless the work falls under one of the exceptions. 
Some courts resisted this interpretation for several years, 38 even 
though a plain reading of the statute supports it.39 Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 40 ended the controversy by holding that 
the principles of the general common law of agency41 determine 
whether a creator is an employee or an independent contractor.42 If 
the creator is an independent contractor and the work does not fall 
under one of the nine enumerated categories, the copyright initially 
vests with the creator.43 
Reid will likely increase litigation under the definition of joint work 
in the 1976 Act.44 Before Reid, joint authorship problems seldom 
arose because the copyright almost inevitably vested in the hiring 
party. But now that copyright will more often initially vest with cre-
ators, questions involving the scope of each author's contribution to 
the work and the authors' intentions to create a joint work will neces-
sarily arise. For example, independent contractors may dispute copy-
right ownership with their employers.45 Or the actual creators of a 
work may dispute copyright ownership among themselves. These new 
joint authorship disputes will often produce concomitant demands for 
an accounting, putting greater pressure on courts to decide whether 
the duty to account is state or federal law.46 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988). These categories include works that are commissioned 
for use [1] as a contribution to a collective work, [2] as a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, [3] as a translation, [4] as a supplementary work, [5] as a compilation, [6] 
as an instructional text, [7] as a test, [8] as answer material for a test, or [9] as an atlas, if the 
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be consid-
ered a work made for hire. 
38. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
982 (1984) (actual control by the hiring party held to make creator an employee, not an in-
dependent contractor); Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) (right 
to control by hiring party held to make creator an employee). 
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire). 
40. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
41. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 220 (1957) (definition of a servant). 
42. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52. 
43. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753. 
44. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988). 
45. Reid itself is an example of an employer-independent contractor dispute and of the in-
creased importance of joint authorship under the 1976 Act. In Reid, a sculptor was hired to 
create a statue as part of a larger work being built by the hiring party. Under the 1909 Act, the 
copyright to the sculpture would have automatically vested in the hiring party. But here the 
Supreme Court held that the sculptor was an independent contractor and thus had the initial 
copyright to his sculpture. The Court left open, probably for further litigation, the possibility 
that the combined work could be considered a joint work. 490 U.S. at 753. 
46. But see 1 ABRAMS, supra note l, § 4.02[C][l][a][i] (claiming that the Restatement defini-
tion of employee is nothing more than a "right to control" standard, similar to that prevailing 
before the enactment of the 1976 Act; thus, the rights of independent contractors are not ex-
panded under Reid). 
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Because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in copyright 
cases,47 this increase in cases may create practical problems. For ex-
ample, if a plaintiff commissions and closely directs the creation of a 
work by an independent contractor and then brings suit against the 
contractor, the plaintiff has two possible claims: sole or joint author-
ship. He may claim infringement based on sole authorship, arguing 
that he is the author "in the same way a poet is author of a poem that 
she dictates to a stenographer."48 He may also have the option of 
claiming sole authorship and infringement under the work-for-hire 
doctrine, arguing that the work falls under one of the nine enumerated 
categories of section 101(2) of the 1976 Act. In either case, the action 
must be pursued in federal courts against the independent contractor. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff may base his claim on joint authorship 
in the work by virtue of his contribution to the creation.49 As a joint 
author, he would have to sue for an accounting, not for infringement. 
If the plaintiff brings the action in federal court, he runs the risk of 
dismissal if the court disallows the infringement count; if he proceeds 
in state court, the same fate may await him if the court holds that the 
accounting rule is an exclusively federal action. 50 
The jurisdictional issue is not the only question concerning duty to 
account that the courts will have to resolve as these cases arise with 
increasing frequency. The courts must also decide how to apportion 
profits among coauthors. In Reid, the D.C. Circuit ruled that anyone 
who contributes more than a de minimis amount to the work is a co-
author51 and receives an equal share of the profits, "even where it is 
clear that [the] respective contributions to the work are not equal."52 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988); see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
48. Marci A. Hamilton, Note, Commissioned Works as Works Made/or Hire Under the 1976 
Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1303 & n.118 (1987), 
cited in 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03[B] n.84; see also Community for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1491 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Henry Moore, for example, engaging others 
to execute his fine art"), affd., 490 U.S. 730 (1989). Such claims of sole authorship have often 
prevailed. See, e.g., Gallery House, Inc. v. Li, 582 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (plaintiff, who 
had given detailed sketches of statues to defendant moldmakers, was held to be sole author of 
statues produced by defendants); M.S.R. Imports, Inc. v. R.E. Greenspan Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 361 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiff, who directed defendant artists to put a Coke logo on the 
side of a wagon design in the public domain, held to be sole author). 
49. See, e.g., Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497 (a statue sculpted by Reid, whose work was generally 
directed by CCNV, coupled with a pedestal for the statue built by CCNV, "might qualify as a 
textbook example of a jointly authored work .... "). 
50. Federal jurisdiction will be exclusive if the court finds jurisdiction under the copyright 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). 
51. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1496. The Supreme Court opinion shed no further light on the 
copyrightability standard; it merely cited the statutory definition of joint work, 11 U.S.C § 101. 
490 U.S. at 735. 
52. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1498, quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.08, at 6-20. The Ninth 
Circuit, on the other hand, has ruled that "joint authorship requires each author to make an 
independently copyrightable contribution." Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th 
Cir. 1990); see Norbert F. Kugele, Note, How Much Does It Take?: Copyrightability as a Mini· 
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This rule leads to equitable results only when a small number of joint 
authors contribute roughly equally to a work. When persons making 
varying contributions to a work all claim joint author status, however, 
the proceeds from the work will be distributed unfairly. As fewer em-
ployers automatically obtain sole ownership of copyright, such fact 
patterns may occur with greater frequency. 
This apportionment of profits among joint owners is not a jurisdic-
tional issue, but its resolution depends on the source of the duty to 
account. If courts determine that the duty to account is federal law, 
federal courts will have a greater hand in fashioning the law that ap-
portions the profits among joint owners. Thus, deciding whether the 
accounting rule is of state or federal origin will shape the evolution of 
the rule. 
II. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE OVER WHETHER THE DUTY To 
ACCOUNT Is A STATE OR A FEDERAL QUESTION 
This Part outlines the case law relevant to a copyright coowner's 
duty to account to other owners. These decisions show that the duty 
to account arose in its modem form almost entirely by means of fed-
eral court decisions. The origination of the accounting rule in the fed-
eral courts supports the claim that the accounting rule is a federal 
common law remedy. 
Three overlapping stages in the case law define the development of 
the jurisdictional question. Section II.A discusses the period begin-
ning in the early part of the century, but developing mostly in the 
1940s and 1950s, in which courts created the duty of a coowner to 
account to other joint owners of a copyright. The decisions of this era, 
rendered almost entirely by the federal courts, never explicitly men-
tioned the jurisdictional question. Section II.B discusses the next line 
of case law, which began in the late 1950s and continues to the pres-
ent. These courts have held that the duty to account is a state com-
mon law remedy. Most have held that only infringement can be 
litigated under federal law, and that an action to determine title alone, 
the crux of most accounting cases, is not a federal question. Barring 
diversity jurisdiction or pendent jurisdiction arising from other federal 
claims, these courts have dismissed cases concerning the duty to ac-
count. Finally, section II.C discusses two cases from the 1980s hold-
ing that at least some disputes over the duty to account involve the 
application and interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions 
of the 1976 Act and so are properly federal questions. 
mum Standard for Determining Joint Authorship, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 809 (discussion of the 
circuit split regarding the copyrightability standard). 
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A. Early Cases 
The earliest American cases dealing with joint ownership of copy-
right and the duty to account were actually state, not federal, cases. 
These decisions, however, held that a coowner had no duty to account 
for profits, and thus they cannot be considered the source of the mod-
em accounting rule. These courts apparently derived jurisdiction 
from the assumption that joint ownership of copyright was identical to 
common law tenancy-in-common and was hence a state law matter. 
The first American case dealing with joint ownership and the duty 
to account, Carter v. Bailey, 53 involved the reproduction of a copy-
righted book by one owner without the consent of the other owner. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the defendant could 
reproduce the book without consent and with no duty to account for 
the profits. In another early state court case, Nillson v. Lawrence, 54 
the court held that coowners of a play could exploit the play without 
the consent of other coowners and refused to award the plaintiff either 
an injunction stopping the production of the play or an accounting for 
profits. Neither of these state courts explicitly mentioned the jurisdic-
tional question. Both apparently considered the coowners to be ten-
ants in common and applied common law property rules.55 
The federal courts originated the modem duty to account after the 
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909.56 The 1909 Act failed to 
address many copyright problems, 57 including the problems of joint 
ownership. To fill these gaps, the federal courts, especially the Second 
Circuit, played an increasing role in adapting the language of the stat-
ute to the needs of the modem publishing and communication 
industries. 
The federal courts' attempts to fashion the rights and remedies of 
copyright coowners began in 1915 with Judge Learned Hand's opinion 
in Maurel v. Smith. 58 Maurel contains the first judicial recognition of 
the duty to account. 59 The plaintiff, an author of a comic opera, 
brought suit against her coauthors, who had taken out a copyright in 
their names only and entered into a licensing agreement with a pub-
lisher. The court held that the defendants held the copyright in a con-
53. 64 Me. 458 (1874). 
54. 133 N.Y.S. 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912). 
55. 133 N.Y.S. at 295. For a short survey of common law tenancy in common as it relates to 
copyright, see Note, supra note 10, at 1554-55. 
56. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
57. For example, such important terms as employer and work made/or hire were left unde· 
fined. See Harris, supra note 31, at 670. Congress tried unsuccessfully several times between 
1924 and 1974 to rewrite the 1909 Act. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legisla-
tive History, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1987). 
58. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), ajfd., 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). 
59. See Vern G. Davidson, Comment, Problems in Co-ownership of Copyrights, 8 UCLA L. 
REV. 1035, 1040-41 (1961). 
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structive trust for the plaintiff, and so were "accountable to the 
plaintiff [to] share and share alike" the royalties from the license.60 
The defendant unsuccessfully challenged the court's jurisdiction, but 
only on the basis that the amount in controversy did not reach the 
minimum of $3000 then required for federal jurisdiction.61 The si-
lence of the record implies that federal jurisdiction over the dispute 
was otherwise uncontroversial. 62 The federal courts reaffirmed the ac-
counting rule of Maurel v. Smith in several decisions beginning in the 
1940s.63 By this time, the federal cases acknowledged the two bases 
for the duty to account: the theory of a constructive trust between 
coowners and the theory of depletion or destruction of the copyright 
by one coowner. 64 
State cases recognizing the duty to account, on the other hand, 
came later than these early federal cases and relied on them as prece-
dent. The leading state case, Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Miller Music, 65 
relied entirely on federal precedent66 to reject the holding of Carter v. 
Bailey. 61 Brown v. Republic Productions, 68 adjudicated by the Calif or-
60. Maurel, 220 F. at 201. 
61. Maurel, 220 F. at 202. The $3000 amount-in-controversy requirement leads to a puzzle 
over jurisdiction. The court must have taken jurisdiction based on either a federal question or 
diversity, both of which had a $3000 amount-in-controversy requirement in 1915. 13B WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 26, § 3561.1, at 5. The court apparently did not base jurisdiction on the 
copyright jurisdiction statute, which has never had an amount-in-controversy requirement. See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. (pt. 1) 1087, 1091-92 ($3000 requirement for diversity 
and federal question jurisdiction; no amount in controversy required for copyright cases). If the 
court relied on diversity jurisdiction, it may have created the accounting rule under the federal 
general common law, rather than state law, since the decision took place before Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (invalidating fedecil general common law). 
62. See also Klein v. Beach, 232 F. 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), ajfd., 239 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1917) 
("Here both Beach and Klein became the owners of Klein's drama, and each could then do with 
it what he pleased, with the duty of accounting over."). 
63. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (applying 
accounting rule in copyright dispute over the musical work 12th Street Rag), modified, 223 F.2d 
252 (2d Cir. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165 
(S.D.N.Y. 1947) (applying accounting rule to song My Melancholy Baby); Edward B. Marks 
Music Corp. v. Wonnell, 61 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (finding parties to be coowners of song 
and therefore entitled to share equally in royalties); Crosney v. Edward Small Prods., 52 F. Supp. 
559 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (acknowledging rights of coowners to an accounting of profits from motion 
picture rights to a play); see also Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co, 140 
F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944) (in a suit involving an injunction, rather than an accounting, the renewal 
of the copyright by one joint owner made him a constructive trustee for the other coowners). See 
generally Davidson, supra note 59, at 1040-44 (general discussion of early accounting cases). 
These decisions occurred after Erie, so they cannot be examples of federal general common law. 
See supra note 61. 
64. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
65. 74 N.Y.S.2d 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947), ajfd., 87 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1949). 
66. 74 N.Y.S.2d at 427. The court cited Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 
73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (My Melancholy Baby), as well as other federal precedent dis-
cussed above. 
67. 64 Me. 458 (1874); see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. . 
68. 156 P.2d 40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), ajfd., 161 P.2d 796 (1945); Brown v. Republic Prods., 
156 P.2d 42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), ajfd., 161 P.2d 798 (1945) (companion case). 
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nia state courts in 1945, acknowledged an author's duty to account to 
his coauthors for the profits from licensing a song. 69 Unlike the previ-
ous cases, however, the Brown cases unquestionably triggered state ju-
risdiction because the songs at issue were unpublished and thus 
protected only by state common law, not federal statutory, 
copyright. 70 
In summary, the federal cases originated the accounting rule after 
it had been rejected by early state court cases. The federal courts, 
which made no explicit mention of the jurisdictional question, seemed 
to have taken federal jurisdiction as a given. 71 State courts began to 
enforce the duty to account only after the federal courts had settled 
the scope of the duty. 
B. Cases Denying Federal Jurisdiction over the Duty To Account 
A line of cases beginning in the late 1950s holds that claims involv-
ing the duty to account do not give rise to federal jurisdiction. 72 The 
duty to account rarely arises in isolation; it flows from a title dispute 
among copyright owners over either a contractual assignment of the 
copyright or joint authorship. 73 For either contract or joint author-
ship cases, this line of authority considers the adjudication of a copy-
right title dispute and the concomitant duty to account to be 
exclusively a state court matter.74 
Some cases decided in the Second Circuit have taken the position 
that federal jurisdiction is only proper when the complaint alleges 
copyright infringement. These courts consider any other copyright 
cause of action, including the duty to account, to be based on state 
law. Harrington v. Mure, 75 a joint authorship case, illustrates this po-
sition. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was a coowner of a 
copyright, for an assignment of his share of the copyright, and for an 
accounting for the profits. 76 The court held that, 
69. 156 P.2d at 41. 
70. The 1976 Act completely preempts common law copyright, thus eliminating the role of 
the states in protecting these rights in unpublished works. 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1988). 
71. None of the cases makes clear whether the federal courts were relying on diversity juris· 
diction or federal question or copyright jurisdiction. See supra note 61. The absence of any 
language explaining federal jurisdiction in most of these cases indicates that the courts did not 
address the question at all. The most likely explanation is that the courts had simply not thought 
through the jurisdictional question, perhaps because no party raised it. 
72. See, e.g., Gorham v. Edwards, 164 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (early dispute over 
agreement for exclusive rights to a song in which court held that the suit for an injunction and an 
accounting arose " 'out of the contract, and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and 
the federal courts are without jurisdiction'") (quoting Danks v. Gordon, 272 F.2d 821, 827 (2d 
Cir. 1921)). 
73. See cases cited supra section II.A. 
74. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-14. 
75. 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (plaintiff alleged that he coauthored a musical com po· 
sition with the defendants). 
76. 186 F. Supp. at 656. 
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[a]bsent a basis for a claim of infringement, a case presenting a claim of 
equitable ownership with a prayer for an assignment and an accounting 
does not "arise under the Copyright Law." ... The sources of the obliga-
tions to assign and to account are equitable doctrines relating to unjust 
enrichment and general principles oflaw governing the rights of co-own-
ers, not remedial provisions of the Copyright Law.77 
Other cases extended the Harrington holding to deny federal jurisdic-
tion to contract cases.78 Courts have also denied federal jurisdiction to 
accounting cases whose classification as joint authorship or contract 
cases is ambiguous. 79 Despite the holdings in these cases, however, 
state courts have rarely taken up Harrington's invitation to litigate 
copyright accounting cases. 80 
C. Cases Recognizing Federal Jurisdiction over 
the Duty To Account 
Like previous Second Circuit cases, T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu 81 
held that a dispute over an alleged assignment of copyright renewal 
rights did not arise under the copyright laws and thus did not give rise 
to federal jurisdiction. The reasoning employed by the Harms court, 
however, differed from that of other Second Circuit cases such as Har-
rington, 82 which claimed that federal jurisdiction arose only in actions 
of infringement. The Harms court concluded that in certain circum-
stances, remedies not expressly granted by the Copyright Act should 
trigger federal jurisdiction. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, for-
mulated a three-pronged test to guide courts in deciding when an ac-
77. Harrington, 186 F. Supp. at 657-58 (citations and footnote omitted). 
78. See, e.g., Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) 
(suit to declare a copyright assignment void by reason of fraud and to get an accounting for the 
profits). Cresci held that, absent a claim of copyright infringement, "a federal court has no origi-
nal jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim of title to a copyright." 210 F. Supp. at 257; see Oddo 
v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984) (parties were coowners of a book by means of a business 
partnership). Citing Harrington, the Oddo court held that a suit to bring a coowner to account 
"does not fall within the district court's jurisdiction," 743 F.2d at 633 n.2; i.e., it is a state law 
matter. See also Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1990) (in dicta, citing 
with approval Oddo's holding that the duty to account does not derive from federal copyright 
law); Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (C.D. Cal. 
1987) (explaining the Oddo holding in dicta). 
79. See, e.g., Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Newman v. Crowell, 205 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases have elements of contract and joint author-
ship cases. The plaintiff in Keith was allegedly a joint author who licensed his coauthor to exploit 
the copyright; the plaintiff in Newman assigned his rights to his coauthor in return for royalties. 
Both cases were dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the courts holding that 
"[a]n action to establish title is not one 'arising under' the Copyright Act .... " Keith, 501 F. 
Supp. at 970 (quoting Newman); Newman, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 519. 
80. But see Mountain States Properties v. Robinson, 771 P.2d 5, 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) 
(rare example of state court taking jurisdiction of a copyright accounting case on the authority of 
Harrington and Oddo). 
81. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). 
82. Harrington v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); see supra notes 75-77 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of this case. 
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tion involving a copyright arises under the copyright laws. This test 
was the basis for recent cases holding that the duty to account arises 
under the copyright laws in certain circumstances and thus should be 
subject to federal jurisdiction. 83 
The Harms test states that an action arises under the copyright 
laws 
[1] if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the 
Act, ... or [2] asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act, • . . or, 
[3] at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a 
distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the 
disposition of the claim. 84 
The first prong of the Harms test merely covers the remedies for "a 
suit for infringement"85 now listed in chapter 5 of the current Copy-
right Act. 86 The next two prongs, however, expand the jurisdiction of 
the court beyond actions solely for infringement. 
Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky was the first case to establish 
federal jurisdiction over the duty to account using the Harms test.87 
The plaintiff in Lieberman claimed to have coauthored a novel and 
screenplay with the defendant. When the plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment of joint ownership and an accounting for the profits, the 
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The court determined that the central issue in the case was the resolu-
tion of the claim for joint authorship, which derives from the defini-
tion of joint work in the Copyright Act. 88 Relying on the second prong 
of the Harms test, the court held that "[r]esolution of the central issue 
in this case depends upon the application and interpretation of this 
statutory definition"89 and that the court thus had subject matter juris-
diction over the claims. 
Goodman v. Lee, 90 a Fifth Circuit case with similar facts, followed 
the reasoning of Lieberman. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judg-
ment that she was a coauthor of a song as well as an accounting for 
her share of the profits. The district court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The appeals court reversed, using the second prong of the Harms test 
and citing Lieberman to validate federal jurisdiction.91 The Goodman 
83. See Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 
535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
84. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828. 
85. 339 F.2d at 828. 
86. 17 u.s.c. §§ 501-10 (1988). 
87. 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
88. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988). 
89. Lieberman, 535 F. Supp. at 91. 
90. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987). 
91. Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1031-32. The reasoning of the Goodman court differed formally 
from that of Lieberman, although the result was identical. Goodman held that resolution of the 
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court attempted to distinguish this case from earlier Second Circuit 
cases, including Harrington v. Mure, 92 denying federal jurisdiction in 
copyright accounting cases. The court characterized the earlier cases 
as contract cases, whereas Goodman and Lieberman involved the con-
struction of the joint authorship provisions of the Act.93 Goodman 
implied that previous case law supported federal jurisdiction for joint 
authorship cases but not for contract cases. 94 
Although Goodman's distinction between contract and joint au-
thorship cases may be logical and correct, it does not accurately reflect 
the cited case law. Previous cases decided in the Second Circuit de-
nied federal jurisdiction to both types of copyright accounting cases. 95 
The facts of Harrington, for example, are nearly identical to those of 
Goodman: the plaintiff, alleging that he was a coauthor of a musical 
composition, sought a declaration of coownership and an accounting 
for his share of the profits, but the court denied federal jurisdiction. 96 
Both Goodman and Harrington are joint authorship cases, and both, 
according to Goodman, should give rise to federal jurisdiction.97 The 
Goodman court, despite its claims to the contrary, was thus unsuccess-
ful in reconciling the earlier case law. 
D. Summary of the Circuit Split 
Until Lieberman was decided in 1984, the Second Circuit adhered 
to a near-blanket rule that an action to establish title does not arise 
under the Copyright Act and is thus a state law question. Since most 
cases concerning the duty to account arise under disputes of title be-
tween joint owners, the Second Circuit relegated the duty to account 
to state courts, barring supplementary or diversity jurisdiction. The 
case depended on the interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), 
rather than the statutory definition of joint work in 17 U.S.C. § 101. 815 F.2d at 1031-32. 
92. 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text 
(discussing Harrington). The court also cited Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 
F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), and Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See 
supra note 79 (discussing Keith). 
93. Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1032. 
94. "[T]he issue [in Rotardier] INVOLVED A CONTRACT, THE SUBJECT OF WHICH WAS A 
COPYRIGHT. GOODMAN'S CLAIM, IN CLEAR CONTRAST, INVOLVES THE VALIDITY OF THE 
COPYRIGHT ITSELF UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT." Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1032; see also 3 NIM-
MER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-11 n.48 ("More precisely, the [Goodman] court should have 
described Goodman's claim as raising the question of joint authorship under the Copyright Act, 
as the validity of the copyright was not at issue in that case."). With this understanding, the 
quoted language from Goodman distinguishes joint authorship cases, which give rise to federal 
jurisdiction, from contract cases, which do not. 
95. See supra section 11.B. 
96. Harrington, 186 F. Supp. at 656; see supra text accompanying notes 75-77. 
97. The court was more accurate in its assessment of the other two cited cases. It correctly 
characterized Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 
as a contract case - no issue of joint authorship arose at all. On the other hand, Keith v. 
Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), involved both joint authorship and contract issues. 
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Ninth Circuit adopted this rule in Oddo v. Ries, 98 where it apparently 
reigns unchallenged. The district court in Lieberman v. Estate of 
Chayefsky 99 recently questioned the Second Circuit precedents by 
granting federal jurisdiction over a claim for a declaration of copyright 
title and an accounting. The Fifth Circuit followed the Lieberman 
analysis in Goodman v. Lee. 100 
Thus, the rule in the Ninth Circuit renders the duty to account a 
state law question. Federal courts in the Fifth Circuit accept jurisdic-
tion over duty-to-account claims in cases involving joint authorship. 
The Second Circuit rule is itself unsettled; under Lieberman, the most 
recent case, the duty to account will also be decided by federal courts 
in cases involving joint authorship. 
The Fifth Circuit attempted to resolve this divergence by claiming 
that in all circuits an action to establish title, and the concomitant 
duty to account, arises under federal copyright law when the claim 
involves a dispute over joint authorship; when the claim involves a 
contract dispute, however, an action to establish title flows from state 
common law principles. 101 Although the logic of this position may be 
sound, it does not accurately reflect the present state of the case law in 
the Second and Ninth Circuits. In these circuits, joint authorship 
claims have been held not to arise under the copyright laws, and the 
holdings of both contract and joint authorship cases are often written 
in language that categorically excludes from federal courts any actions 
other than actions for infringement. Part Ill of this Note sorts out the 
logic underlying these positions. 
III. THE CLAIM FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DUTY 
ToAccouNT 
A federal court that has received a copyright complaint requesting 
an accounting must consider two questions before it can exercise juris-
. diction. First, it must ask whether the duty to account is federal or a 
state law. After this preliminary inquiry, it may go on to ask whether 
federal court is the correct forum for the complaint. 
The first question - the source of the duty to account - allows at 
least two possible answers. A court may hold that copyright owner-
ship, although established by federal law, is merely another form of 
ownership, governed by ordinary state common law rules. In this 
view, copyright coowners would be treated like tenants in common of 
any other type of property.102 Section III.A argues the contrary the-
98. 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984). 
99. 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
100. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987). 
101. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
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sis: the duty to account, created by the federal courts as federal com-
mon law and ratified by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976, is 
more properly considered federal law. 
Section III.B discusses the second question, that of the correct fo-
rum. If the duty to account comes from federal common law, the fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction. The question grows more complicated, 
however, if courts consider the duty to account to be state law. This 
section argues that joint authorship cases should trigger federal juris-
diction, even if the source of the accounting remedy is state law, be-
cause of the federal interest in construing the joint authorship 
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976. Only if the plaintiff claims 
rights by virtue of contract rights alone - that is, by assignment of 
copyright - should the federal court dismiss the case in favor of state 
jurisdiction. 
Section III.C discusses the application of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule to copyright accounting cases. It concludes that if the duty 
to account is federal law, the rule will not bar federal jurisdiction. If 
the duty to account is state law, an allegation of joint authorship in the 
complaint should satisfy the rule. 
A. The Source of the Duty To Account 
This section gives two reasons for considering the accounting rule 
to be a federal remedy. First, the federal courts created the rule by 
federal common law. Second, Congress ratified the rule in the Copy-
right Act of 1976. These developments demonstrate that the source of 
the duty to account is federal. 
1. Federal Common Law 
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 103 courts have viewed judicial 
decisionmaking that creates federal common law with suspicion. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]here is no federal 
general common law"104 did not end the creation of all federal com-
mon law. The Erie Court simply held that federal courts sitting in· 
diversity actions must apply the common law of the states to such 
actions, not a separate federal general common law. 105 On the same 
day that the Court decided Erie, it affirmed that federal courts re-
tained the power to create common law in areas of federal 
competence.106 
103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
104. 304 U.S. at 78. 
105. 304 U.S. at 78. 
106. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (hold-
ing that federal common law controlled a border dispute between two states); see also Boyle v. 
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (applicability of state tort law to government 
defense contractors): 
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Courts and commentators have justified the creation of federal 
common law in several ways, 101 at least three of which may justify the 
creation of a federal duty to account. First, Congress may have omit-
ted a remedy for joint owners through inadvertence, forcing the courts 
to create one as an interstitial, gap-filling measure. Second, Congress 
may have delegated lawmaking power to the federal courts by provid-
ing a skeletal legislative scheme, with the expectation that the courts 
would formulate detailed substantive law as needed. Third, a domi-
nant federal interest in the rights of joint copyright owners may re-
quire a federal common law solution and a preemption of state law. 
This section discusses each of these justifications in turn to see whether 
they provide adequate support for creating a federal accounting rule. 
First, Congress may have simply overlooked the problem, even 
though it intended to apply federal law. Statute-making is necessarily 
incomplete because of defects in the political process and the limita-
tions of human foresight. 108 Inadvertent omission is especially likely 
in copyright law, which is complex and apt to be removed from the 
experience of most legislators. When a statute is in some way incom-
plete, the courts often fill the gap.109 The 1909 Act made no explicit 
reference to joint ownership, 110 but the statute set up the framework in 
which two authors may jointly create a work, thereby necessitating an 
apportionment of rights between them. If the statute is silent, but 
Congress intended federal law to apply in this area, the federal courts 
have an obligation to supply the missing terms. 
Second, Congress may have intended to delegate to the federal 
courts the power to create substantive law as needed. Courts have 
often found an implicit delegation of authority to the courts when con-
fronted with a skeletal legislative scheme.111 Although the 1909 Act 
[A] few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," .•. are so committed by the Constitu· 
tion and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and re· 
placed, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory 
directive) by the courts - so-called "federal common law." 
487 U.S. at 504 (citations omitted). 
107. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.7 (1985) (discus· 
sion of the situations in which federal courts have applied federal common law). 
108. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of ''Federal Law'~· Competence and Discretion in the 
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1957). 
109. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180-87 (1949) (determining the meaning of 
vague words in the statute); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 68 (1953) (discussion of cases where the federal courts supplied missing statutes of limita· 
tions). Some consider such interstitial lawmaking to be statutory interpretation, rather than 
common Jaw. But see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death 
of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 332 (1980) (asserting that the difference between statutory 
interpretation and common law is "a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind"). 
110. See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (repealed 1976) (codification of the Copy-
right Act of 1909 with amendments); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.01, at 6-2 n.l. 
111. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (constru· 
ing jurisdictional statute to be an implicit delegation of authority to fashion a body of federal 
labor Jaw). Most common are the cases in which the courts find an implied private right of 
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as a whole cannot be considered skeletal, the complete lack of refer-
ence to joint ownership suggests, if not inadvertence, an implicit dele-
gation of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps. 112 
Inadvertent omission or congressional delegation of authority seem 
plausible in light of the highly specialized nature of copyright legisla-
tion. The people that it affects are small in number and concentrated 
in a few narrow geographic areas. Legislators are unlikely to be famil-
iar with the subject, and they are even less likely to have a great deal of 
interest in the details of the statute they enact. Inevitably, experts -
either a few interested legislators, or, more likely, representatives of 
the affected industries - will draft the statute, and legislators will vote 
on it with little idea of what it actually contains.113 Thus, legislative 
intent, always difficult to determine, is especially nebulous in copy-
right law. 
The peculiar qualities of the 1909 Act make congressional intent 
even more difficult to ascertain. The 1909 Act is a curious mixture of 
extreme specificity in some places and broad generalizations in 
others.114 "[T]he statute ... leaves the development of fundamentals 
to the judges. Indeed the courts have had to be consulted at nearly 
every point, for the text of the statute has a maddeningly casual prolix-
ity and imprecision throughout."115 The haphazard quality of this 
statute, coupled with the abstruseness of the subject to most legisla-
tors, makes a conclusive determination of specific congressional intent 
hopeless in many cases. This intent is even more elusive when one is 
action in a vaguely worded statute. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private 
right of action implied from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The Court has recently been 
more reluctant to create such private rights of action. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); 
Robert H.A. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to 
Barak. 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227 (1984). Borak, however, involved a subject that had previously 
been regulated by the states (corporate law). The Supreme Court's reluctance to legitimize fed-
eral common law remedies in every corporate law context thus seems reasonable. But the Court 
may not show equal reluctance to legitimize federal co=on law remedies created in copyright 
law, an exclusively federal domain. 
112. An implicit delegation seems especially likely, given the jurisprudence of the day. The 
federal courts in 1909 operated under the pre-Erie rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 
(1842), which allowed the federal courts to create general co=on law to govern diversity dis-
putes rather than applying state rules of decision. Thus, Congress would have been aware of the 
wide powers of the federal courts to fashion co=on law when it enacted the Copyright Act of 
1909, and it might have expected the courts to use those powers in interpreting the Act. 
113. The legislative history of the 1976 Act shows that Congress generally left negotiation of 
specific provisions to interested industries, with legislators acting as mediators to keep the negoti-
ations on track. See Litman, supra note 57, at 870-71. Since the problems of drafting the 1909 
Act were probably not too dissimilar from those of the 1976 Act, industry was probably also 
highly involved in shaping the 1909 Act. 
114. The 1909 Act is "crammed with details on matters ranging from the formalities of no-
tice, registration, and so forth," while large questions, such as what elements of a work are 
protectable, or what takings are actionable, are left open. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED 
VIEW OF CoPYRIGHT 38-40 (1967). 
115. Id. at 40. 
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searching for the reason for omission of a provision, rather than the 
reason for inclusion. 
Given the absence of direct evidence of congressional intent con-
cerning the lack of joint ownership provisions in the 1909 Act, evi-
dence of congressional intent must come indirectly from 
considerations of general policy. These policy considerations argue 
against an intention to leave the rights of joint copyright owners to the 
states. Suppose Congress intended that the states should choose how 
to handle the rights of joint copyright owners. The states would have 
at least three contradictory ways of doing so: each owner might be 
required to get permission from all other owners before exploiting the 
copyright (the English rule); 116 each owner might be free to exploit the 
copyright subject to a duty to account (the present accounting rule); 117 
or each owner might be free to exploit the copyright without any duty 
to account (as in patent law).118 Allowing the states to choose any of 
these three would make the rights of copyright coowners uncertain. 
Furthermore, even assuming each state decided to use the analogy of 
tenancy-in-common, the application might vary from state to state. 119 
The rights afforded to joint owners might vary, for example, depend-
ing on a state court's choice between the rules of coownership of real 
property as compared to personal property.120 
Allowing the states to determine the rights of a copyright coowner 
is contrary to all the statutory sources of copyright law: first, the 
copyright statutes aim for national uniformity of rights; 121 second, the 
jurisdictional statute gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction 
over copyrights, 122 and finally, a constitutional provision allows the 
federal government, not the states, to establish an author's exclusive 
right to his writings.123 If Congress in this instance intended to legis-
late contrary to its general policy of uniformity of copyright remedy, it 
116. See Note, supra note 10, at 1558. 
117. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
118. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1988) (allowing joint owners of a patent to exploit their invention 
without accounting to the other owners). 
119. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 321-24 (2d ed. 1988). 
120. See Note, supra note 10, at 1554-55 (general discussion of common law tenancy-in· 
common). 
121. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-801 (1988). 
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). The statute that codified exclusive copyright jurisdiction 
was passed in 1874. Act ofJune 22, 1874, ch. 12, § 711, 18 Stat. (pt. 1) 134-35 (''The jurisdiction 
vested in the courts of the United States •.. shall be exclusive of the courts of the several States: 
..• [o]f all cases arising under the ... copyright laws of the United States."). Federal recognition 
of the desirability of having nationally uniform federal copyright remedies thus existed when the 
Copyright Act of 1909 was passed. 
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This policy favoring national uniformity of copyright law 
dates back to James Madison, who wrote that "[t]he States cannot separately make effectual 
provision" for copyright and patent law. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 338 (James Madison) 
(John C. Hamilton ed., 1868). 
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would likely do so expressly, rather than by simple omission of any 
relevant provision. 
In sum, the omission of provisions relating to the rather obscure 
problems of joint authorship was likely either an inadvertent omission 
or a congressional delegation of authority to fill in gaps in the statu-
tory language. The least likely possibility, given the nature of the stat-
ute and the policy considerations outlined above, is that Congress or 
the drafters actually had a specific intent to leave the remedies af-
forded joint authors to the states, and that they chose to show this 
intent by simple omission of any relevant provision. 
The third and final justification for the use of federal common law 
- protection of a dominant federal interest - comes from the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 124 
which "instructs us that even in the absence of express statute, federal 
law may govern what might seem an issue of local law because the 
federal interest is dominant." 125 The federal government's overriding 
interest in national uniformity of rights of copyright owners may be a 
sufficient justification for creation of the duty to account and the pre-
emption of any contrary state law by the federal courts.126 Under the 
Clearfield Trust doctrine, the courts should enforce the duty to ac-
count until Congress makes clear in legislation that it does not con-
sider such a remedy to be in the federal interest. 
Preemption of state law and creation of federal common law on 
this ground does not depend on a specific congressional intent in 1909 
to delegate authority to the courts. Congress may have given abso-
lutely no thought to the problems of joint ownership. Nevertheless, if 
the federal courts determine that federal interests would be impaired if 
state law were applied, they may impose a federal common law 
solution.127 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the 
124. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In a dispute over whether a state rule should apply to co=ercial 
paper issued by the U.S. government, the Court held that in the absence of a federal statute, "it is 
for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule oflaw according to their own standards." 318 
U.S. at 367. 
125. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1964) (commenting on the 
application of the Cleaifield Trust doctrine to a copyright case); see also Mishkin, supra note 108, 
at 801: "Though this language [of the Cleaifield decision] speaks directly only of the United 
States, •.• the basic rationale underlying this passage would seem equally apposite to any issue 
bearing a substantial relation to an established national government function." 
126. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction: Dominant Federal Interest May Be a Possible Basis for 
Federal Jurisdiction, 1965 DUKE L.J. 828, 834 (discussing Hanns and suggesting that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338, the copyright jurisdiction statute, should be interpreted broadly so as to encompass those 
copyright cases involving a strong federal interest). 
127. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCA-
TION OF JUDICIAL POWER 84 (1st ed. 1980): 
The presence of federal legislation manifests a congressional determination that important 
federal interests are at stake, which supersede any competing state concerns. While Con-
gress may not have considered the specific issue before the court, it may still be appropriate 
in such cases for the federal judiciary to develop its own legal principles. 
2018 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1998 
courts with much evidence about congressional purposes and federal 
interests in copyright. For example, the legislative history of section 
301, which abolished state common law copyright law, 128 shows that 
national uniformity of copyright protection is an important goal of 
copyright law: 
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the 
Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to 
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of de-
termining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and 
in the separate courts of the various States. Today, when the methods 
for dissemination of an author's work are incomparably broader and 
faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright protec-
tion is even more essential than it was then to carry out the constitu-
tional intent. 129 
The federal courts may use this explicitly stated federal interest in na-
tional uniformity to justify preempting conflicting state laws and re-
placing them with a uniform federal duty to account. 
By acknowledging that the accounting rule is federal law, federal 
courts will adjudicate cases that would otherwise have gone to state 
courts. 130 Some of these cases may not actually tum on federal issues, 
and one might argue that a federal accounting remedy is therefore 
overinclusive. For example, one of the parties in T.B. Harms v. 
Eliscu 131 sought an accounting. At issue was whether one of the coau-
thors had previously assigned away his renewal rights. Had the court 
granted federal jurisdiction, the central issue litigated would have been 
the state contract issue. 
Two grounds justify the possible overinclusiveness of a federal ac-
counting remedy. First, many of the cases where plaintiffs seek an 
accounting involve disputes between joint authors. The federal gov-
ernment has a strong interest in uniform interpretation of the joint 
See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. R.Bv. 1, 
46 (1985): 
Preemptive lawmaking rests on the idea that federal courts can establish legal rule X. even 
where there is no specific intention that they do so, provided it can be shown that rule X is 
necessary in order to avoid frustrating federal policy Y, as to which there is a manifestation 
of specific intent on the part of the enacting body. 
Under Professor Merrill's analysis, creating a federal duty to account is legitimate, even in the 
absence of a specific congressional intent to delegate authority to do so, as long as the court can 
show that failing to create this remedy will frustrate a clear federal policy, such as uniformity of 
copyright remedy. 
128. Before 1976, copyright in unpublished works was initially secured by state common law 
copyright. Federal protection became effective only upon publication of the work. The Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1988), abolished this dual system of copyright laws. The 
explicit preemption of state law in this area provides an analogy for the courts to follow in 
displacing any vestigial state law of joint ownership with a federal duty to account. 
129. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1976). 
130. See infra section III.B. l. 
131. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). 
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authorship provisions of the Copyright Act.132 Without a federal ac-
counting rule, these issues of joint authorship may be left to state 
courts. 133 
Second, the federal interest in uniformity of remedy outweighs the 
burden of having the federal courts adjudicate even those accounting 
cases where the federal issues are peripheral. Without a federal ac-
counting rule, states would be free to choose among various ways of 
allocating rights among coowners of copyright.134 Only plaintiffs who 
allege infringement would have the benefit of a uniform federal rule. 
The provisions for copyright infringement demonstrate that Con-
gress is willing to allow an overinclusive remedy to protect the federal 
interest in uniformity of remedy. To obtain federal jurisdiction, a 
copyright infringement plaintiff must show three things: the plaintiff's 
ownership of the copyright; copying by the defendant; and distribution 
for exhibition.135 Ownership usually involves only state law contract 
issues. But even when the defendant concedes copyfug and distribu-
tion, leaving ownership as the only issue in dispute, the complaint con-
fers federal jurisdiction.136 The federal interest lies in uniform, expert 
application of the federal remedy. The same federal interest arises in 
an accounting case in which the only dispute is over contract issues. 
The state interest in hearing these cases is small. Although states 
have a legitimate interest in enforcing their contract laws, the federal 
courts have been the primary adjudicators of copyright law, including 
many cases that involve state law contract disputes, since federal juris-
diction over copyrights became exclusive over a century ago. 137 A 
state's loss of jurisdiction over this small class of specialized cases will 
only marginally reduce that state's ability to enforce its contract law. 
In any event, the Erie doctrine requires a federal judge who tries an 
accounting case that involves state contract principles to follow state 
132. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1987) (joint authorship 
case involved "the application and interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions of 17 
U.S.C. § 201(a)"); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
("Resolution of the central issue [in a joint authorship case] ... depends upon the application 
and interpretation of [the] statutory definition" of joint work, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).). 
133. The federal interest in adjudicating joint authorship claims may be sufficiently strong 
that such cases might justify federal jurisdiction even without a federal accounting remedy. See 
discussion infra section 111.B.2. But federal jurisdiction is assured if the accounting remedy is 
federal. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
135. See Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1987). 
136. See Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Cohen, 817 F.2d at 73-74; see also Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 971 
(4th Cir. 1990) ("The difficulty or centrality of ... state law questions cannot defeat jurisdiction" 
over a complaint that properly alleges copyright infringement.). 
137. Exclusive federal copyright jurisdiction was codified in 1874 by the Act of June 22, 
1874, ch. 12, § 711, 18 Stat. (pt. 1) 134, 134-35 (repealed 1909). 
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contract law. 138 Thus, federal courts will vindicate state interests in 
the small number of cases taken from state courts. 
2. Congressional Ratification of the Federal Duty To Account 
Although policy considerations suggest that Congress intended to 
allow the federal courts to create federal common law rules governing 
joint ownership, 139 the only direct expression of congressional intent 
before 1976 came from congressional failure to pass a statute overrul-
ing the federal courts. Courts and commentators generally consider 
such a failure to act to be weak evidence of congressional intent.140 
The Copyright Act of 1976, however, completely revised the 1909 
Act141 and provided fresh evidence of congressional intent. 
The 1976 Act mentions joint ownership explicitly in two places. It 
offers a definition of joint work, 142 and it provides that joint authors 
are "coowners of copyright in the work."143 Thus, the 1976 Act 
shows that Congress intended joint authorship at least to be deter-
mined by reference to federal statute, not state common law. 
Although the 1976 Act does not mention the duty to account or 
coownership in general, the legislative history shows unequivocally 
that Congress intended to retain the duty to account. The House 
Committee Report on section 201, after first stating that "court-made 
law on this point is left undisturbed," 144 expressly set out the duty to 
account: coowners are to be "treated generally as tenants in common, 
with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the 
use of the work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners 
"145 
138. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-3 to -4 ("[C]ontractual rights [concern-
ing copyright] are a matter of state law."). 
139. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. 
140. "Ordinarily, 'Congress' silence is just that - silence.' " Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (quoting Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 
(1987)). 
141. Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, wrote of the 1976 Act: 
The New Act is ..• a completely new copyright statute, intended to deal with a whole range 
of problems undreamed of by the drafters of the 1909 Act •... Properly designated, the New 
Act is not a "general revision," but is as radical a departure as was our first copyright 
statute, in 1790. 
Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 479 
(1977) (footnote omitted). 
The Copyright Act of 1909, on the other hand, was mostly "a bringing together of scattered 
statutory provisions with relatively few changes or innovations." Id. 
142. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (1988). Joint authors, although undefined, are presumably persons who produce a joint 
work. 
143. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). 
144. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976). See supra text accompanying 
note 21. 
145. Id. For a full text of this part of the report, see supra text accompanying note 21. 
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This language demonstrates that Congress envisioned a national, 
uniform remedy for coowners.146 Such a remedy will only occur if it is 
federal law, binding on all courts.147 Leaving the states free to choose 
not to enforce a duty to account, or to require the consent of all 
coowners before exploitation of the copyright, would undermine con-
gressional intent. 
Tracing the legislative history chronologically from 1961 to 1965 
by means of the Copyright Law Revision provides a similarly straight-
forward understanding of the legislative intent. 148 The original 1961 
report of the Register of Copyrights recommended omitting any men-
tion of the accounting rule in the statute in order to maintain the rule 
intact from previous case law.149 This recommendation generated few 
comments and little controversy.150 The resulting provisions regard-
ing coownership in the 1964 preliminary draft of the new copyright 
law were almost identical to those finally passed by Congress in 
1976.151 In short, the drafters of the coownership provisions of the 
1976 Act essentially borrowed the original 1961 recommendations of 
the Copyright Office. The purpose of the provisions, as embodied in 
the House Committee Report, also remained unchanged. 
The case law ratified by the 1976 statute held that the duty to ac-
count was a federal remedy. Although neither Congress nor the 
courts likely contemplated the jurisdictional question before the draft-
ers of the Act began work in 1961, the basic outlines of the accounting 
remedy at that time were fairly clear. By 1976, the duty to account 
146. The statute does not say that the courts are to apply the rules oftenancy-in·common of 
the several states. Using state law would imply nonuniformity of remedy. Furthermore, if the 
law between joint owners were to be left to the states, Congress would have no power to choose 
tenancy-in-common over, say, joint tenancy as a desirable judicial solution. See supra notes 116-
20 and accompanying text. 
147. The Supreme Court has held that state courts must apply federal common law. Local 
174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
148. Most of the work of writing the 1976 Act was done by the collaboration of the Register 
of Copyrights with various interested industry groups between 1961 and 1965 and presented to 
Congress in the five-part Copyright Law Revision. See 1-5 STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 87TH-89TH CONG., CoPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
CoPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. CoPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961-
65) [hereinafter CoPYRIGHT LAW REVISION]. 
149. "The rules established by the court decisions in regard to co-owners of a copyright -
that any one co-owner may use or license the use of the work, but that he must account for 
profits to the other co-owners - should be left undisturbed." 1 Id. at 90. The Copyright Office 
saw "no need to restate [these rules] in the statute." 1 Id. at 89. 
150. A few consultants unsuccessfully recommended changes. For example, Irwin Karp and 
Melville B. Nimmer recommended adopting the English rule, in which all coowners must agree 
before the work is exploited. See 2 id. at 318, 374. 
151. "The authors of a joint work shall be considered co-owners of copyright in the work." 
A footnote added that a joint work "would be defined elsewhere as a work prepared by two or 
more authors in collaboration or with the intention that their contributions be merged into indis-
tinguishable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. 
Copyright Law § 14(a), reprinted in 3 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 148, at 15. Cf. 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 20l(a) (1988) (definition of joint work; status of joint owners). 
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was a well-established rule, created and applied universally by the fed-
eral courts to all copyright coowners regardless of their state resi-
dence.152 Regardless of whether the jurisdiction to hear these cases 
came from federal question jurisdiction 153 or the copyright and patent 
jurisdiction statute, 154 the federal courts - and implicitly Congress -
considered the duty to account to be a federal remedy.155 
Even if one ignores the legislative history entirely and looks only at 
the language of the statute, the Copyright Act of 197 6 ratifies previous 
case law regarding the duty to account. Congressional silence in the 
Act is stronger evidence of congressional intent than silence before en-
actment.156 Congressional silence regarding the accounting rule, espe-
cially in an act that is such a radical rethinking of previous copyright 
law, 157 strongly implies a congressional satisfaction with the status 
quo. 
In sum, the federal courts created the duty to account between 
copyright coowners through a legitimate use of federal common law. 
The creation of the duty to account can be considered either an inter-
stitial, gap-filling measure, or the result of an implicit delegation of 
authority from Congress to create detailed law on joint ownership. 
Congress ratified this federal common law solution when it passed the 
Copyright Act of 1976. In its Committee Reports, Congress approved 
of the court-made law regarding the duty to account and set out the 
details of that law explicitly. The duty to account is thus federal law, 
and it should be binding on all courts, state or federal. 
B. Jurisdiction 
Federal jurisdiction in copyright cases, like all federal question ju-
152. See supra section II.A. 
153. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1988). 
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). 
155. Beginning in 1958 with Gorham v. Edwards, 164 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), a few 
courts in which the plaintiff demanded an accounting began questioning this jurisdictional as· 
sumption. See Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); 
Harrington v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also supra section 11.B. The courts 
denied jurisdiction in these cases, declaring that they turned on questions of state contract law or 
copyright ownership, which traditionally have not given rise to federal jurisdiction. 3 NIMMER, 
supra note 1, § 12.0l[A]. The courts apparently considered the duty to account an ancillary 
issue; for example, in Gorham, the court made no mention of the duty to account at all except in 
its recital of the facts. 164 F. Supp. at 782. The legislative history provides no indication that the 
drafters of the Copyright Act of 1976 considered these decisions. These cases seem to oppose the 
congressional intent to define a uniform national duty to account, discussed supra notes 145-47. 
156. The Supreme Court endorsed this sort of evidence from silence in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), a case involving a private right of action 
under a federal securities statute that occurred after Congress had amended the statute. When 
Congress amended the statute, the Court reasoned, it must have known that courts were rou-
tinely implying private rights of action to enforce the statute's provisions. Nevertheless, Con-
gress did not prohibit such private rights of action in the amendment. The Court took this as 
implicit consent to the status quo. 
157. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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risdiction, initially derives from the constitutional clause extending 
federal judicial power to all cases "arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority."158 The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
clause to give Congress the power to confer jurisdiction whenever a 
federal law is an "ingredient" of a cause of action. 159 Because federal 
copyright law is an ingredient of any copyright case, federal jurisdic-
tion over the duty to account turns on whether Congress has chosen to 
confer jurisdiction by statute. 
This section shows that jurisdiction for copyright accounting cases 
depends on whether the courts hold that the accounting rule is federal 
or state law. If the accounting rule is federal law, as argued in section 
III.A above, the copyright jurisdiction statute triggers federal jurisdic-
tion. Even if courts hold that the accounting remedy is state common 
law, the jurisdiction statute triggers federal jurisdiction for joint au-
thorship cases, leaving only contract cases to be adjudicated solely in 
state courts. 
1. Federal Accounting Rule 
Section III.A argued that the duty to account is a common law 
creation of the federal courts and is thus a federal remedy. A federal 
common law remedy gives rise to federal jurisdiction in the same way 
as an explicit statutory remedy. 160 Thus, any copyright coowner who 
seeks an accounting should be able to raise his claim in federal court. 
Because courts developed the duty to account to fill a gap in the copy-
right laws, jurisdiction over the accounting rule falls under section 
1338, the patent and copyright jurisdiction statute,161 rather than sec-
tion 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute.162 Section 1338 
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. 163 Accounting rule 
158. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
159. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824); see also 13B 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 3562, at 22 (discussing the extreme breadth of constitutionally 
permitted federal jurisdiction). 
160. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("§ 1331 [federal question] 
jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory 
origin."); REDISH, supra note 127, at 96 (2d ed. 1990) ("It is also established that a case may 
'arise under' federal common law, as well as under statutory or constitutional provisions."); 
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 883, 
897 (1986). 
The copyright jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988), should support federal common 
law claims as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). "No essential variance in the construction of 
'arising under' is noticeable in the individual application of the [jurisdiction] statutes." Note, 
supra note 126, at 828 n.4. 
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). 
162. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1988). 
163. '.'[J]urisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases." 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). One could argue that the accounting remedy falls under the provisions 
of § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute, which gives concurrent federal jurisdiction 
over actions arising under "the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
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claims should therefore trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
2. State Accounting Rule 
This section assumes arguendo that the duty to account is a state 
common law rule. It argues that even without a federal accounting 
rule, the language of the copyright jurisdiction statute is broad enough 
to give federal jurisdiction over some of the cases in which an account-
ing is sought: those in which a dispute arises between copyright coau-
thors. These cases, unlike those involving coowners whose rights arise 
by contract, involve the interpretation of the joint ownership provi-
sions of the Copyright Act of 1976. The federal interest in the correct 
interpretation of these provisions suffices to confer federal jurisdiction, 
even if the remedy sought is held to exist only under state law. 
The general federal question jurisdiction statute164 and the statute 
dealing specifically with copyrights and other intellectual property165 
have "arising under" language nearly identical to that of Article III; 
federal courts, however, have never interpreted these statutes to confer 
federal jurisdiction whenever the constitutional "ingredient" test is 
satisfied.166 Courts have created self-imposed limits to federal jurisdic-
tion for reasons of policy: for example, to avoid usurping the role of 
the state courts in the federal system, to leave to the states those cases 
that tum predominantly on state issues, and to avoid overburdening 
the federal system with cases that only marginally bear on federal 
interests.167 
§ 1331 (1988). This language is more general than that of§ 1338, which requires that the action 
arise under an "Act of Congress relating to •.• copyrights •••. " 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). 
"Laws ... of the United States" might more easily include federal common law than an "Act of 
Congress." See Edward H. Cooper, State Law of Patent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. REV. 313, 
34-0 n.101 (1972) (discussing the analogous case of federal common law of patent agreements). 
The argument for concurrent jurisdiction is strained, however. The duty to account was 
developed to effectuate the policies of the copyright laws, whose grant of jurisdiction comes 
under § 1338. Moreover, after the implicit ratification of the duty to account in the Copyright 
Act of 1976, an action for an accounting can now be said to arise under an "Act of Congress 
relating to •.. copyrights," i.e., the Copyright Act of 1976. 
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ••• copyrights • • • • Such 
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ••• copyright cases." 
166. "This Court has never held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Art. 
III 'arising under' jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true .... Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction 
is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under§ 1331 •.•. " Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank 
of Nigeria, 461U.S.480, 494-95 (1983). For example, a case involving a disputed assignment or 
license of a copyright does not trigger federal jurisdiction, even though the existence of a copy-
right forms an "ingredient" of the cause of action. See, e.g., Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. 
Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 3582, at 310; 3 NIMMER, supra 
note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-15. 
167. If the ingredient theory of Article III had been carried over to the general grant of 
federal question jurisdiction now contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there would have been no 
basis - to take a well-known example - why federal courts should not have jurisdiction as 
to all disputes over the many western land titles originating in a federal patent, even though 
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Copyright accounting cases, however, present countervailing con-
siderations weighing in favor of federal jurisdiction, including the de-
sire for national uniformity of remedy and the need for adjudication 
by a tribunal with expertise in federal issues.168 The policies favoring 
federal jurisdiction vary depending on the type of copyright account-
ing case presented to the court. Joint authorship cases implicate fed-
eral interests to a greater degree than contract cases because the rights 
of joint authors are specifically addressed in the Copyright Act of 
1976.169 Contract cases, on the other hand, involve mostly issues of 
state law. 
The best-known test to determine whether a claim "arises under" 
the federal jurisdiction statutes is the three-prong test devised by 
Judge Friendly in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu. 170 If, as posited, the duty 
to account is a state remedy, a claim for an accounting does not fall 
under the first prong of the Harms test - "a remedy expressly granted 
by the [Copyright] Act"171 - because only actions for infringement 
have an express remedy in the 1976 Act. 172 Contract cases fail the 
second prong of the Harms test as well: "a claim requiring construc-
tion of the [Copyright] Act."173 An assignment of a copyright asserts 
no claim requiring construction of the Act. These issues are based in 
state law contract rights and require adjudication no different from 
any other contract claim. Nor do contract cases fall under the third 
prong: courts have never held that a copyright assignment implicates 
"a distinctive policy of the Act [that] requires that federal principles 
control." 174 
the controverted questions normally are of fact or of local land law. Quite sensibly, such 
extensive jurisdiction has been denied. 
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir. 1964); see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 26, § 3562, at 22. 
168. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS 35 (1965) (Tentative Draft No. 3) commentary on 
§ 131 l(b) ("In patent and copyright cases the federal courts ... have experience, which the state 
courts lack .•.• "). For the historical rationale behind the need for the federal judiciary, see 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 2-3 (1989) (explaining the need for uniformity 
and the fear of state hostility to federal interests). For policy rationales favoring exclusive federal 
adjudication of the related field of patent law agreements, see Cooper, supra note 163, at 315. 
169. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (1988). 
170. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964). See supra text accompanying note 84 for the full text of 
the Harms test. 
171. 339 F.2d at 828. 
172. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-10 (1988). A federal common law remedy should trigger federal juris-
diction, however, just as an express remedy would. See supra section 111.B.1. This first prong 
appears to have come from Justice Holmes' statement that "[a] suit arises under the law that 
creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 
260 (1916), modified by Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 
(1983). A federal common law remedy fits as well as an express remedy under this test. 
173. 339 F.2d at 828. 
174. 339 F.2d at 828; see 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-3 to -4. But see Cooper, 
supra note 163, at 340-44 (advocating federal jurisdiction for all contract cases in the analogous 
field of patent agreements). 
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Joint authorship cases, however, will often present a claim requir-
ing construction of the joint authorship provisions of the Act.175 Such 
cases satisfy the second prong of the Harms test. 176 Construction of 
the joint authorship provisions of the 1976 Act by the federal courts is 
especially important after Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid. 111 Because Reid restricted the work-for-hire doctrine, claims of 
joint authorship are likely to increase in number, creating new 
problems of statutory construction for the courts to resolve. 178 Courts 
do not agree on how much work a person must contribute before ris-
ing to the status of coauthor.179 Moreover, additional joint ownership 
cases may cause courts to rethink the present rule that allows two 
coauthors who make substantially differing contributions to receive 
equal shares in the resulting accounting. Federal jurisdiction is more 
likely to lead to uniform solutions to these questions of construction of 
the 1976 Act.180 
. The federal courts should take jurisdiction, however, only when 
they must construe the joint authorship provisions of the Act. Even 
when the parties are joint authors, the pleadings may show that they 
do not dispute any issue of joint authorship. For example, one joint 
author may contest the other author's performance of an agreement 
concerning the joint work. If the pleadings show that neither party 
disputes joint authorship, the case is actually a simple contract case, 
even though it involves a contract between joint authors. Such a case 
does not require construction of the Act and does not require federal 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a case contains bona fide disputes 
over both joint authorship and contract issues, courts should grant 
federal jurisdiction. The mere presence of contract issues should not 
deny federal jurisdiction to a case that would otherwise qualify be-
cause of unresolved joint authorship questions.181 
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of joint work); 17 U.S.C.§ 20l(a) (1988) (vesting ini· 
tial title to the copyright in the joint authors). 
176. This prong of the Harms test comes from Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, 255 U.S. 
180 (1921), a case concerning jurisdiction under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Harms, 
339 F.2d at 827. The court in Harms cites De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), as an 
application of this principle under the copyright jurisdiction statute, currently at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) (1988). But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 3562, at 26 n.24 (questioning the 
value of De Sylva as precedent because the Court did not discuss jurisdiction and so is not bound 
by the decision). 
177. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
178. See supra section I.B. 
179. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
180. Although the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he novelty of [a federal] issue is not 
sufficient to give it status as a federal cause of action," Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thomp· 
son, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986), the novelty of joint authorship issues is only one reason to confer 
federal jurisdiction. Federal courts will also produce more uniform decisions and bring their 
expertise in copyright law to bear. 
181. Under this analysis, the courts wrongly decided Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), and Newman v. Crowell, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), when they 
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Two copyright accounting cases have recognized federal jurisdic-
tion under the statutory construction prong of the Harms test. 182 
Both cases concerned disputed coauthorship, not assignment. Lieber-
man v. Estate of Chayefsky 183 held that the resolution of the case de-
pended on the application and interpretation of the statutory definition 
of joint work; 184 Goodman v. Lee 185 held that the resolution depended 
on the copyright ownership provisions.186 These two cases offer good 
examples of courts correctly applying the Harms test to grant federal 
jurisdiction. Under this analysis, however, the court's denial offederal 
jurisdiction in Harrington v. Mure 187 would have been incorrect had 
the case arisen under the Copyright Act of 1976. The plaintiff in Har-
rington claimed relief based on his alleged coauthorship of a work, 
which would have required an interpretation of the statutory provi-
sions regarding joint authorship.188 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed the Harms test. 
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 159 
the Supreme Court quoted the Harms test and enunciated a similar 
two-prong test for determining federal question jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1331. The complaint must establish "either [1] that federal law . 
creates the cause of action or [2] that the plaintiff's right to relief nec-
essarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 
law."19° This test seems to be an implicit restatement of the Harms 
test. The first prong of the Franchise Tax Board test apparently de-
rives from the same source as the first prong of the Harms test. 191 
denied federal jurisdiction because both presented contract issues. Both cases presented bona fide 
issues of joint authorship as well as contract issues. See supra note 79. 
182. Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535 
F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). These cases are discussed supra notes 87-97 and accompanying 
text. 
183. 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) . 
. 184. 535 F. Supp at 91; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). 
185. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987). 
186. 815 F.2d at 1031-32; see 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). 
187. 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
188. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. On the other hand, contract cases such 
as Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), and Oddo v. 
Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984), which did not involve any dispute over joint authorship, were 
correctly decided when the courts denied federal jurisdiction. See supra note 78. 
The third prong of the Harms test - the "dominant federal interest" test - may also trigger 
jurisdiction by justifying the creation of federal common law, from which jurisdiction may fol-
low. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text. No opinion has yet relied on this prong, 
perhaps because of the obvious applicability of the second prong. 
189. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). This case dealt with a state suit by the California Tax Board to 
compel the Trust to pay certain tax levies. The Trust, which claimed that the levies were pre-
empted by federal law (BRISA), removed the suit to federal court. 463 U.S. at 4-7. The 
Supreme Court held that the federal courts did not have federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). 463 U.S. at 28. 
190. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28. 
191. "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well Works 
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This prong of the Franchise Tax Board test may also confer federal 
jurisdiction over actions based on federal common law remedies, 192 as 
well as actions that implicate a dominant federal interest, 193 the third 
prong of the Harms test. The second prongs of both the Harms and 
the Franchise Tax Board tests are substantially similar,194 and appar-
ently derive from the same source.195 Thus, the Supreme Court's two-
prong te8t implicitly endorses the substance of the Harms test.196 
On the other hand, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thomp-
son, 197 the Supreme Court narrowly read its Franchise Tax Board test. 
The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow sued under Ohio law, which recognized a 
private tort action against defendants who violated a federal drug reg-
ulatory statute.198 The federal statute created no federal private reme-
dies, however. 199 After repeating the Franchise Tax Board test,200 the 
Court denied federal jurisdiction, even under the second, "substantial 
question of federal law" prong of the test. Read narrowly, this opinion 
denies federal jurisdiction unless federal law creates the cause of 
action.201 
Neither Franchise Tax Board nor Merrell Dow, however, is exactly 
on point: Franchise Tax Board is an application of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule202 to a declaratory judgment action, and Merrell Dow 
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (the Holmes test), modified by Franchise 
Tax Bd. Cf. the first prong of the Harms test: "[A]n action 'arises under' the Copyright Act if 
and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act •••• " 339 F.2d at 828. 
192. The "federal law" that "creates the cause of action" could as easily be federal common 
law as a federal statute. 
193. Whatever federal law creates the dominant federal interest could be said to "create the 
cause of action." 
194. Compare Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (holding that an action arises under the Copyright 
Act if the complaint "asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act") with Franchise Tax Bd., 
463 U.S. at 28 (federal courts have jurisdiction when "the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily 
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law"). 
195. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), cited with approval in 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9, and Harms, 339 F.2d at 827. 
196. In the end, the Court denied federal jurisdiction over the claim for reasons unrelated to 
its test for jurisdiction. The Court held that the complaint failed to satisfy the well-pleaded 
complaint rule as applied to a state declaratory judgment action. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 
13-22. • 
197. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
198. 478 U.S. at 805-06. 
199. 478 U.S. at 806-07. 
200. The Court cited Franchise Tax Board for the propositions that a case may arise under 
federal law where "federal law creates the cause of action," 478 U.S. at 808, and where " 'the 
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.' " 
478 U.S. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9). 
201. We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of 
a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, 
federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim "arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States.'' 
478 U.S. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)). 
202. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (discussing the well-pleaded complaint 
rule). 
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concerns state incorporation of a federal regulatory standard.203 
Neither case predicts what courts would do if confronted with a copy-
right accounting case that included an allegation of joint ownership. 204 
Because Supreme Court rulings remain ambiguous on this jurisdic-
tional question, and have failed to address it in the context of copy-
right, the federal interest in uniform, expert interpretation of the joint 
authorship provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976205 compels lower 
federal courts to recognize federal jurisdiction by holding that such 
cases "depend[ ] on resolution of a substantial question of federal 
law."206 
In sum, even if courts hold that the duty to account is a state law 
remedy, they should accept federal jurisdiction over copyright cases in 
which one party demands an accounting based on a claim of joint au-
thorship. Such cases implicate the federal interest in interpreting the 
joint authorship provisions of the Copyright Act. Cases in which one 
party demands an accounting based solely on contract rights do not 
implicate this federal interest. Joint authorship cases warrant federal 
jurisdiction under the second prong of the Harms test - they "as-
sert[ ] a claim requiring construction of the Act"207 - or under the 
second prong of the Franchise Tax Board test: "the plaintiff's right to 
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 
federal law."208 
203. Joint authorship cases may be considered incorporation cases, but of an odd kind: as-
suming that the duty to account is a state remedy, the state is obliged to incorporate the federal 
joint authorship standard. This contrasts with Merrell Dow, where the state chose to use federal 
standards as a basis for negligence, rather than draft its own substantive standard of conduct. 
204. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), is arguably on point. In De Sylva, the 
Court decided a disputed question of partial ownership of copyright renewal terms. Although 
the Court did not indicate how it had jurisdiction over the dispute, jurisdiction was presumably 
based on the need to construe certain provisions of the Copyright Act - there was no diversity 
of citizenship and no infringement. By not addressing jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may have 
implicitly provided support for the second prong of the Harms test. T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 
F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). On the other hand, the Court is 
not bound by a jurisdictional ruling in a case when jurisdiction is not raised. See WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 26, § 3562, at 26 n.24. Thus, the outcome of De Sylva, while suggestive, is not 
dispositive. 
205. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. 
206. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 U.S. at 28. One question remains unanswered: is federal juris-
diction over joint authorship questions exclusive or concurrent? The best answer is that it is 
exclusive. Joint authorship disputes "arise under'' the copyright laws, which means that jurisdic-
tion is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988). This statute gives jurisdiction "exclusive of the 
courts of the states in •.. copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). Some believe that 
jurisdiction arising from the interpretation of the copyright statute should be concurrent, how-
ever. See AMERICAN LA w INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS 88 (1968) (Tentative Draft No. 6) (commentary on § 1311(b)) 
(stating that De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) "may well have been considered [a case] 
of concurrent jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331."). See 
supra note 204 for a discussion of De Sylva. 
207. 339 F.2d at 828. 
208. 463 U.S. at 28. 
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C. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule 
The federal courts are bound not only by the jurisdiction statutes, 
but also by the well-pleaded complaint rule.209 The Supreme Court in 
Franchise Tax Board recently reaffirmed the rule: jurisdiction " 'must 
be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's state-
ment of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything 
alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the 
defendant may interpose.' "210 Satisfying one of the two prongs of the 
Franchise Tax Board test211 is necessary but not sufficient to give juris-
diction to the federal courts. The well-pleaded complaint rule thus 
excludes from federal court some suits that pass the Franchise Tax 
Board test.212 The Court considers itself obliged to uphold the well-
pleaded complaint rule, "for reasons involving perhaps more history 
than logic,"213 even when it "produce[s] awkward results."214 
The well-pleaded complaint rule does not bar federal jurisdiction if 
the accounting rule is one of federal law. The plaintiff's complaint 
will necessarily contain a request for relief in the form of an account-
ing. With a federal element necessarily present in the complaint, the 
rule is satisfied. If the accounting rule is a state remedy, however, the 
well-pleaded complaint rule has the potential of leading to what the 
Court calls "awkward results." Even if the remedy is based on state 
law, the well-pleaded complaint rule appears to be satisfied if the 
plaintiff alleges joint authorship, because a federal issue appears in the 
complaint. 215 But problems may arise when a complaint contains is-
209. The well-pleaded complaint rule, a judicially created doctrine, is usually traced back to 
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Over time, the rule has taken on a quasi-
constitutional status, although it is often criticized for arbitrarily restricting federal jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Wei/-
Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS 
L.J. 597 (1987). The rule applies to actions under the copyright jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338 (1988), as well as federal question jurisdiction. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-10 (1988) (applying well-pleaded complaint rule to a patent case under 
§ 1338); Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) (well-pleaded com-
plaint rule applied to a copyright case under § 1338). 
210. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) 
(quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)). 
211. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
212. Franchise Tax Board itself serves as an example. The plaintiff California Franchise Tax 
Board filed suit in California court over the defendant's failure to pay certain tax levies required 
by California law. The defendant removed the case to federal court on the ground that its activi-
ties were covered by a federal law (BRISA), which preempts California state law. 463 U.S. at 3-
7. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the defense of preemption was the only question 
truly at issue. But it denied federal jurisdiction for one of plaintiff's causes of action because the 
preemption was a defense and thus was not a necessary element of the complaint - "a straight-
forward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule." 463 U.S. at 13. 
213. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4. 
214. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12. 
215. Defendant may argue that the well-pleaded complaint rule is not satisfied because plain-
tiff's claim of joint authorship is not necessary to frame the complaint: plaintiff would still have 
an action in state court without the allegation of joint authorship. But the allegation of joint 
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sues of both contract and joint authorship.216 At this preliminary 
stage of the litigation, the court will have difficulty piercing the plead-
ings to find out whether the question of joint authorship is truly at 
issue. The court may be tempted to consider such a suit to be based on 
state law and deny jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint 
rule.211 
Construing the well-pleaded complaint rule to exclude such combi-
nation contract/joint author cases from federal jurisdiction would be 
unwise. The rights of joint authors are based on federal statute and 
federal judicial interpretation. After Reid, 218 these rights are in a state 
of flux and should be determined by federal courts, where uniformity 
can better be enforced.219 Joint authors' rights fall within the 
Franchise Tax Board test, requiring "resolution of a substantial ques-
tion of federal law,"220 and they should not be excluded by the well-
pleaded complaint rule. 
The well-pleaded complaint rule may also be an obstacle to suits in 
which sole and joint authorship are pleaded in the alternative. Sole 
authorship cases involve infringement and are federal matters.221 If 
courts consider the duty to account in joint authorship cases to be a 
state remedy, and if courts further rule that joint authorship claims 
fail the Harms test, the well-pleaded complaint rule may bar federal 
jurisdiction: "a claim supported by alternative theories in the com-
plaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless [federal] 
law is essential to each of those theories."222 
A solution to these difficulties is attainable. Courts should hold 
that a plaintiff's bare allegation of joint authorship in the complaint is 
sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction.223 Unfortunately, federal 
authorship is necessary to show that the complaint is of the type that federal courts should hear. 
This should be a sufficient showing of necessity to pass the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
216. See, e.g., Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Newman v. Crowell, 205 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases both involved plaintiffs who claimed joint 
authorship in a work and a breach of contract regarding the assignment or licensing of the work. 
See supra note 79. . 
217. Both Newman and Keith were dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. See supra note 
79. The courts did not reach the well-pleaded complaint issue, however, deciding the cases in-
stead on the ground that the actions did not arise under the copyright laws. 
218. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
219. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
220. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13. 
221. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
222. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988). This is a patent 
law case, but since the same jurisdiction statute applies (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988)), the result 
should be the same. 
223. Examples of cases in which the well-pleaded complaint rule did not bar federal jurisdic-
tion are Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987), and Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 
535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The courts, however, did not discuss the applicability of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule in the opinions. 
The courts should require the plaintiff to allege that he is a joint author, not that he obtained 
title from an earlier joint author. Joint authorship questions could conceivably arise even in the 
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courts may get a number of cases in which plaintiffs plead joint au-
thorship merely to qualify for federal jurisdiction. The court may 
hope to deter many such cases by quick dismissal or by sanctions.224 
Even if a number of frivolous cases remain, however, federal courts 
should initially take jurisdiction. To do otherwise would be to elimi-
nate this class of actions from the federal court system, since under the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, courts must determine jurisdiction ini-
tially by looking at the face of the complaint alone.22s 
Courts in similar circumstances have shown a willingness to con-
strue the well-pleaded complaint rule liberally to avoid injustice to the 
parties and to give the plaintiff his choice of forum. For example, a 
plaintiff in his pleadings often presents a dispute over an assignment or 
a license of a copyright as a federal infringement action as follows: the 
plaintiff rescinds the contract and then sues for infringement, asserting 
that the defendant is copying the work without permission. Some 
courts have held that such complaints satisfy the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule, even though the actions can also be characterized as state 
contract disputes.226 If the infringement claim has no real merit (that 
is, if the assignment was in fact valid), the court may later dismiss the 
action in a motion for summary judgment227 or dismiss at the court's 
discretion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.22s 
Courts should follow the same procedure in joint authorship ac-
counting cases. If the plaintiff alleges he is a joint author on the face 
of his complaint, the court should deem the complaint to satisfy the 
well-pleaded complaint rule. If the defendant in his answer demon-
strates that joint authorship will not be an issue - for example, if the 
defendant admits to joint authorship and disputes only facts that raise 
contract issues - the court may immediately dismiss the case for fail-
ure to state a cause of action229 or lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 230 If the court determines later that the joint authorship claim 
has no merit, and that the suit is predominantly a contract dispute, the 
court should dismiss the suit without prejudice in a motion for sum-
mary judgment, giving the plaintiff an opportunity to bring the claim 
latter case. But the probability of such questions' arising diminishes the further the plaintiff is 
removed from joint authorship. This rule, like the well-pleaded complaint rule itself, is a way of 
allowing federal courts to make a rough cut at the pleading stage when the likelihood that federal 
issues will arise is low. 
224. See infra text accompanying notes 229-32. 
225. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). 
226. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing plaintiff to 
rescind licensing agreement and sue defendant for copyright infringement in federal court). 
227. See, e.g., Malinowski v. Playboy Enters., 706 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (dismissing 
plaintiff's claim for infringement on motion for summary judgment when court learned that a 
contract dispute was the only issue). 
228. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(l). 
229. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6). 
230. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(l). 
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in the appropriate state court. If the claim for federal jurisdiction was 
frivolous or abusive, Rule 11 sanctions may be appropriate.231 Such 
sanctions would be a powerful deterrent to litigants who would use 
this liberal interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule to assert 
federal jurisdiction improperly.232 
CONCLUSION 
A joint owner of a copyright is under a duty to account to other 
owners for their share of any profits realized by the exploitation of the 
work. This Note supports the position that the duty to account is a 
federal remedy. It is a creation of federal common law, fashioned by 
the federal courts to fill gaps in the statutory language of the Copy-
right Act of 1909, using common law tenancy-in-common as a model. 
As a federal remedy, the duty to account promotes national uniform-
ity and expert adjudication of rights of copyright owners, much like 
the statutory remedy of infringement. As a federal common law rem-
edy, the duty to account "arises under" the copyright laws of the 
United States, just as the statutory remedy of infringement "arises 
under" those laws. Thus, a complaint asking for an accounting should 
be given exclusive federal jurisdiction. The federal interest in national 
uniformity of remedy outweighs the state interest in adjudicating con-
tract issues arising in disputes involving coowners of copyrights. 
Even if the courts reject the preceding analysis and hold that the 
accounting remedy is a creation of state law, the federal courts should 
have jurisdiction over at least a portion of the copyright accounting 
cases. Copyright accounting cases can be divided into two classes: 
231. FED. R. Clv. P. 11. 
232. A problem may arise if the plaintiff wishes to try a joint authorship case in state court, 
but the defendant wishes to remove to federal court. Suppose the plaintiff serves a complaint in 
state court, in which he merely recites the allegation that he is coowner of the copyright without 
alleging joint ownership. The defendant may want to raise the defense that the plaintiff is not a 
coowner because he is not a joint author. Should the defendant be allowed to remove the case to 
federal court? Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988), the defendant may remove a case to federal 
court if the plaintiff could have brought the case in federal court originally. At first glance, the 
answer appears to be no: the defendant seems to run afoul of the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
because the federal element of the claim arises in a defense. But such a defendant may still get 
federal jurisdiction if the court holds that the allegation of joint authorship is a necessary part of 
the complaint. That is, the plaintiff, as part of a well-pleaded complaint, must specify whether he 
intends to rely on joint authorship for his claim of ownership of the copyright. "[A] plaintiff may 
not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." Franchise 
Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). 
Similarly, a plaintiff who wishes to deny that defendant is a joint author of a work should be 
able to get a declaratory judgment in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). The underly-
ing coercive action - the defendant's suing the plaintiff for an accounting - will satisfy the well-
pleaded complaint rule if an allegation of joint authorship is a necessary part of the complaint. 
See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 
16 ("Skelly Oil has come to stand for the proposition that 'if, but for the availability of the 
declaratory judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created 
action, jurisdiction is lacking.'") (quoting lOA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2767, at 744-
45). 
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contract cases, in which coownership of the copyright came about by 
assignment of the copyright; and joint authorship cases, in which 
coownership came about from joint contributions to the creation of 
the work by the coowners. Federal interests are implicated to different 
degrees in these two classes of disputes. Claims for a declaration of 
joint authorship and an accounting should be given federal jurisdic-
tion. Such claims "arise under" the copyright laws because they re-
quire the application and interpretation of the joint authorship 
provisions of the copyright statute. These provisions are particularly 
unsettled after Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, and they 
require federal interpretation. Contract claims, on the other hand, are 
at base state law claims, and the concomitant demand for an account-
ing does not change them into claims that "arise under" the copyright 
laws, unless the accounting remedy is itself considered federal. 
Copyright owners want predictable application of the laws and a 
certain choice of forum. The judiciary, on the other hand, must also 
concern itself with maintaining a proper balance between the federal 
and state court systems. The position outlined in this Note - that the 
duty to account should be considered a federal remedy, and that copy-
right accounting actions should be tried in federal court - provides 
the best balance of these competing interests. It provides copyright 
owners the predictability they need while infringing only marginally 
on the interests of the states. 
